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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This case ultimately involves only one question: whether Defendants-

Respondents Ada County Sheriff Gary Raney, Ada County, and the Board of Ada
County Commissioners (collectively, "Ada County") are responsible for the costs of
medical care of an inmate-patient injured while in the custody of the Ada County
Sheriff, but who is released from custody while still hospitalized so that he can
continue to receive medical care. Plaintiff-Appellant Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center ("Saint Alphonsus") submits that, pursuant to Idaho Code §20-605

& §20-612 (which incorporates §20-605), Ada County is responsible for medical
services provided after an inmate-patient's release from custody.
Specifically, Saint Alphonsus seeks review of the District Court's ruling on
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. There, the District Court held
that Ada County was not responsible for the costs of medical care for an inmate
released from custody for the purpose of securing additional medical care. Saint
Alphonsus contends that, in so ruling, the District Court misinterpreted the
governing statutes and erroneously ruled that the release from custody of an
inmate-patient needing medical care thereby relieved Ada County of its obligation
to pay for that inmate's medical care.

Saint Alphonsus requests reversal of the

District Court's summary judgment decision.

B.

Course of the Proceedings
Saint Alphonsus brought this action against Ada County via a Verified
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Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Complaint for Damages on March 26,
2105, which Complaint was subsequently amended. (Record ("R."), 7-31 & 32-24.)
Following discovery, cross-motions were filed by Ada County and Saint
Alphonsus on August 16 and 17, 2016, respectively. (R., 53-54 & 115-116.) Hearing
upon the cross-motions was held on September 14, 2016. (Transcript ("Tr."), 6-64.)
The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment was filed on October 25, 2016. (R., 259-268.) The Judgment
was filed on March 2, 2017. (R., 269-270.)
Saint Alphonsus timely filed its Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2017. (R., 271275.)

C.

Concise Statement of the Facts
On January 21, 2014, I.C-T. (hereinafter "Patient"), was charged with

domestic battery or assault in the presence of a child, Idaho Code §18-918(4), in the
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, Case
No. CR-MD-2014-0000913 ("First Criminal Case"). (R., 33 at i!5; 17; & 45 at ,r5.)
The Patient was arraigned by video before the Ada County magistrate on January
21, 2014. (R., 33 at i!6; 45 at ,r6.) He entered a not guilty plea and a bond of $1,000
was set. (Id.) At the time of arraignment, he was in the custody of the Ada County
Sheriff and incarcerated at the Ada County Jail. (Id.) He remained incarcerated at
the Ada County Jail from that time through March 27, 2014. (Id.)
On March 27, 2014, while still incarcerated at the Ada County Jail and in the
Ada County Sheriffs custody, he was charged with three counts of sexual abuse of a
minor under sixteen years of age, Idaho Code §18-1506, in a separate criminal
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matter in the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Ada, Case No. CR-FE-2014-0004295 ("Second Criminal Case"). (R., 34 at i/7; 45 at
i/7.) On that same date, March 27, 2014, the Patient attempted to commit suicide
by hanging himself. (R., 34 at ,is; 45-46 at ,is.) He was then transported to Saint
Alphonsus in critical condition on that same date to receive care and treatment.

(Id.; R., 169-170, i/i/6-7.)

Ultimately, due to the seriousness of the injury, he

required care and treatment until May 24, 2014, when he was then discharged and
released from Saint Alphonsus's care. (R., 170-174 at i/i/S-lS.)
In the interim, a pre-trial conference in the First Criminal Case had been
scheduled for April 3, 2014. (R., 34-35 at i/10; 22; 46 at i/10.) In the Magistrate
Minutes/Notice of Hearing, Magistrate Judge Theresa Gardunia noted that the
patient was recently charged with another felony and, while in custody, attempted
suicide and was still in the hospital. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge noted that the
State moved to "ROR" on that day, and an Order of Release was entered the same
date (April 3, 2014). (R., 34-35 at ,r10; 22-23; 46 at

if 10.) The pre-trial conference

was then reset for thirty days out. (R., 34-35 at i/10; 22; 46 at i/10.)
Also in the interim, on April 4, 2014, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada
County filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Release Defendant on His Own Recognizance in
the Second Criminal Case. (R., 34 at i/9; 19-20; 46 at ,r9.) It provided the following:
A Complaint and Warrant were served on the Defendant, but before he
could be arraigned on the charges, the Defendant attempted suicide.
The Defendant is currently in critical condition at St. Alphonsus
Hospital connected to a breathing tube. The State has been informed
that the hospital personnel hope to transfer the Defendant to another
facility at this time and unable to determine if he will make a full
recovery. The State anticipates that releasing the Defendant ROR at
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this time will allow his family to make necessary medical decisions and
facilitate the transfer of the Defendant. The State intends to
immediately seek reinstatement of the bond should the Defendant's
condition improve to the point where he can be released from a medical
care facility and arraigned on the current charges. The Defendant's
speedy trial rights have not begun to run as he has yet to be arraigned.

(Id.)

An Order of Release was signed by Magistrate Judge James Cawthon and

entered that same date. (R., 34 at i!9; 21; 46 at ,r9.)
On May 5, 2014, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County filed a
Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice of the Second Criminal Case. (R., 35 at ,r11;
24-25; 46 at i!ll.) It provided the following:
A Complaint and Warrant were served on the Defendant, but before he
could be arraigned on the charges, the Defendant attempted suicide.
The Defendant was in critical condition at St. Alphonsus Hospital
connected to a breathing tube, and although he has somewhat
physically improved, he is still housed at the hospital. The State has
been informed that the hospital personnel hope to transfer the
Defendant to Mexico for long-term care through the Mexican consulate.
At this time it is unknown when or even if the Defendant will ever be
competent to stand trial. The Defendant is in the country illegally and
St. Alphonsus is eager to have him transferred to his native country.
Should the Defendant return to the United States or be found
competent to stand trial, the State anticipates refiling the charges.

(Id.) An Order to Dismiss without Prejudice was then entered on May 8, 2014. (R.,
35 at ,r11; 26; 46 at i!ll.) On May 8, 2014, the State also moved to dismiss the First
Criminal Case, and the Court dismissed it on that date. (R., 35 at ,r12; 46 at if 12.)
The Patient ultimately incurred $304,374.92 in medical expenses/bills during
his stay at Saint Alphonsus from March 27, 2014 through his discharge on May 24,
2014. (R., 35-36, at i!13; 27-31; 46-47, at ill3.) These medical expenses/bills were
submitted to Ada County for payment. (Id.) The Ada County Sheriff paid for the
medical care and treatment provided by Saint Alphonsus through the date on which
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both orders for Release on his Own Recognizance were entered (April 4, 2014). (Id.)
Despite a demand from Saint Alphonsus for payment on the remaining dates of
service, the Ada County Sheriff has refused to make any further payments relating
to the remaining medical services even though the Patient required care and
treatment at Saint Alphonsus through May 24, 2014. (Id.) The remaining unpaid
balance as is in dispute in this matter, as reduced to the reimbursement rate
specified in Title 31, Chapter 35, Idaho Code, is $97,835.18. (Id.)

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Saint Alphonsus identifies the following issues on appeal:
Whether the District Court erred in holding that Ada County was not
responsible for the medical expenses incurred for the medical care and treatment
rendered by Saint Alphonsus to Patient from April 5, 2014 through May 24, 2014,
and thereby granting summary judgment in favor of Ada County.

III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Saint Alphonsus only seeks an award of costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40.

IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The inmate-patient at the heart of this matter was in the custody of Ada
County on multiple felony charges when he attempted suicide. He was brought to
Saint Alphonsus at the direction of Ada County, and was subsequently released on
his own recognizance on an ex-parte motion to the magistrate court, to allow the
inmate-patient to continue receiving medical care. While Ada County paid for the
medical services for the time period that the Patient remained in-custody, it refused
to accept responsibility for the remaining dates of services through the Patient's
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discharge following his release on April

4th.

As explained below, counties are generally charged, by statute (Idaho Code
§31-3302), with responsibility for medical care expenses for individuals incarcerated
in their jails; two more specific statutes (Idaho Code §20-605 & §20-612) address the
particulars (including medical costs) of incarceration costs and payment therefor, In
a 1993 decision by this Court which echoes the issues in this matter (St. Alphonsus
Reg'l Med'l Ctr., Ltd. v. Killeen, infra), it was held that these statutes "collectively
indicate that it is ultimately the sheriffs responsibility to pay for prisoners' medical
expenses." In doing so, this Court held that, under the then-existing versions of the
statutes, that counties were responsible for all costs incurred for medical care, but
only while the inmate was in-custody.
The Legislature amended the statutes the following year to address the
result in Killeen. While still obligating the counties to pay for inmate medical care,
it provided a trade-off of sorts to address the seemingly harsh outcomes in Killeen
that impacted both parties (the counties and medical providers): instead of full
payment of medical costs, counties would now only have to pay a reduced
reimbursement rate such as paid in medical indigency matters, but counties would
now remain on the hook for medical costs after inmates were released for the
purpose of receiving medical care.

These adjustments were expressly added to

Idaho Code §20-605, and Idaho Code §20-612 was amended to cross-reference and
incorporate the provisions of §20-605 regarding medical costs.

Importantly, the

Legislature did not amend these statutes to replace them with the more complicated
and cumbersome medical indigency process.
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In ruling upon summary judgment in this matter, the District Court held
that §20-605 did not apply to Patient's post-release medical costs, finding that §20605 only applied to inmates housed for the benefit of another county. In doing so,
however, the District Court erred in not recognizing that the provisions regarding
payment of medical costs (including payment for medical costs post-release) were
expressly incorporated into the statute governing inmates (such as Patient) housed
in the same county in which they are ordered to be held: §20-612.

Further, the

District Court erred in finding that post-release costs for same-county inmates
were, instead, covered by Idaho's medical indigency program (Title 31, Chapter 35),
an argument rejected by the Killeen court, a conclusion not otherwise altered by the
Legislature's 1994 amendments.
For these reasons, as discussed further below, the District Court erred in its
Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, which
decision should be reversed and the matter remanded to the District Court.

V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of
review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment." Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.3d 1100,
1101-02 (2002)(citation omitted). "All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Id. at 47. "Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Id.

"If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law

remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Id.

VI.

A.

ARGUMENT

Idaho Code §§20-605, 20-612, and 31-3302, and the Killeen decision.
1.

The statutes at issue.

The determination of a county's obligation to reimburse a hospital (here,
Saint Alphonsus) for medical care provided to an inmate is set out in a number of
statutes.
First, Idaho Code §31-3302(3) provides for the County's general obligation to
make such reimbursements:
31-3302. County charges enumerated. The following are county
charges:
(3) The expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons
charged with or convicted of crime and committed therefor to the
county jail. Provided that any medical expenses shall be paid at the
rate of reimbursement as provided in chapter 35, title 31[1], Idaho
Code, unless a rate of reimbursement is otherwise established by
contract or agreement.
In turn, Idaho Code §20-605 addresses how a County is to specifically address
costs of confinement, including medical costs, as follows in salient part:
20-605. Costs of confinement. The county wherein any court has
entered an order pursuant to section 20-604, Idaho Code, shall pay all
direct and indirect costs of the detention or confinement of the person
1 Chapter 35, Title 31 relates to Idaho's medical indigency laws, which provides for the
method by which providers are reimbursed for medical services provided to indigent county
patients. For purposes of this appeal and the statutes at issue, the salient portion of the
medical indigency laws referred to - the rate of reimbursement - is Idaho Code §313502(23), which defines the "reimbursement rate" applicable to medical indigency matters.
At present, the "reimbursement rate" is 95% of the unadjusted medicaid rate.
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to the governmental unit or agency owning or operating the jail or
confinement facilities in which the person was confined or detained ....
In the absence of such agreement or order fixing the cost as provided in
section 20-606, Idaho Code, the charge for each person confined or
detained shall be the sum of thirty-five dollars ($35.00) per day, plus
the cost of any medical or dental services paid at the rate of
reimbursement as provided in chapter 35, title 31, Idaho Code, unless
a rate of reimbursement is otherwise established by contract or
agreement; provided, however, that the county may determine whether
the detained or confined person is eligible for any local, state, federal
or private program that covers dental, medical and/or burial expenses.
That person will be required to apply for those benefits, and any such
benefits obtained may be applied to the detained or confined person's
incurred expenses, and in the event of the death of such detained or
confined person, the county wherein the court entered the order shall
pay all actual burial costs. Release from an order pursuant to
section 20-604, Idaho Code, for the purpose of a person
receiving medical treatment shall not relieve the county of its
obligation of paying the medical care expenses imposed in this
section ....
(emphasis added).2
Importantly - and key in this appeal - Idaho Code §20-612, next in turn, also
directs the County to pay for medical services for inmates, by reference to §20-605:
20-612. Reception and board of prisoners. The sheriff must receive all
persons committed to jail by competent authority except mentally ill
persons not charged with a crime and juveniles. It shall be the duty of
the board of county commissioners to furnish all persons committed to
the county jail with necessary food, clothing and bedding, and
medical care as provided in section 20-605, Idaho Code, and the
board of county commissioners is authorized to pay therefor out of the
As an aside, that the Patient was held per LC. §20-604 ("Any district judge or magistrate
may order a person confined or detained .. . in any county or municipal jail or other
confinement facility within the judicial district in which the court is located.") is obvious
(R., 17), given the "any" language of the statute and this Court's recent emphasis on
applying laws as plainly written. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho
889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011)("'[W]here a statute or constitutional provision is plain,
clear, and unambiguous, it 'speaks for itself and must be given the interpretation the
language clearly implies."'); accord, Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 882, 380 P.3d 681,
695 (2016)(" This Court does not have the authority to modify an unambiguous legislative
enactment.")
2
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county treasury under such rules and regulations as they may
prescribe.
(emphasis added).
As explained herein, these statutes make clear - contrary to the District
Court's determination - that counties are obligated to make payment for inmates'
medical care provided by providers such as Saint Alphonsus, even when those
inmate-patients are released from custody to receive medical care.
2.

The Killeen decision and subsequent amendment of the
statutes at issue.

Underlying the question of the governing statute regarding reimbursement
for

medical care provided to

a

patient-inmate

is

the

question of what

reimbursement is owed when an inmate is released from custody to receive medical
care.

This question was previously presented to this Court in the case of St.

Alphonsus Reg'l Med'l Ctr., Ltd. v. Killeen, 124 Idaho 197, 858 P.2d 736

(l993)("Killeen").
In Killeen, a somewhat factually similar case to the instant one, an individual
was arrested on an Ada County bench warrant in Canyon County, and transported
to Ada County.

While in custody, the inmate required medical care and was

brought to Saint Alphonsus; while still receiving care, she was released from
custody on her own recognizance.

A dispute between Saint Alphonsus and Ada

County arose as to whether Ada County had to pay for all amounts incurred for
medical care (including those costs incurred after the inmate-patient's release from
custody) and whether Idaho's medical indigency laws (Title 31, Chapter 35)
governed the reimbursement of medical care expenses to Saint Alphonsus.
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Under the then-existing version of Idaho Code §31-3302, no reference was
made to medical costs, but it did make the "county responsible for all expenses
'necessarily incurred in the support of those persons in the county jail."' 124 Idaho
at 199. Because of this, the Killeen court concluded that it was "clear that Idaho
law places on the county the financial responsibility for all persons maintained in
the county jail." Id.
In attempting to avoid responsibility for the medical costs, Ada County
pointed to the then-existing version of Idaho Code §20-612, arguing that it was
silent on medical expenses, thereby limiting the meaning of §31-3302.

Id.

However, the Killeen court concluded that the listed items in §20-612 was not an
exclusive list, and did not limit §31-3302's meaning. Id. The Killeen court further
looked to the language of Idaho Code §20-605 (which did, at the time, specifically
address medical costs), noting that it obligated a county from which a confinement
order had issued to reimburse the actual costs incurred for the medical care of the
inmate to the county that actually housed the prisoner. Id. The Killeen court went
on to also note that Idaho Code §20-605 allowed for the determination of whether an
inmate was eligible for outside benefits that might cover those costs, and requiring
inmates to apply for such benefits so as to be applied to the inmate-patient's
incurred expenses. Id.

In light of these provisions, the Killeen court found that

Idaho Code §20-605 provided "guidance by analogy for finding that the county in
which the prisoner is detained is obligated to pay and shows that the legislature
contemplated that the county generally would pay medical expenses and then, m
appropriate situations, be reimbursed." Id.
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Given this, the Killeen court ruled that Ada County was responsible for all
medical costs incurred while an inmate was in custody:
We are sympathetic to Ada County's policy arguments against being
responsible for medical expenses-the anomaly being that when an
indigent is in jail, the hospital recovers more money than it would
under the indigency scheme and the reality that the sheriffs office is
not ordinarily so constituted to seek indemnity from other sources.
Nonetheless, the statutes collectively indicate that it is ultimately the
sheriffs responsibility to pay for prisoners' medical expenses. Reallocation of that responsibility is within the province of the
legislature.
Because the statutes provide that the sheriff and the county are
responsible only for those in their custody, a fortiori the county need
not pay for an inmate's medical expenses incurred after that person is
no longer in custody. We thus affirm the trial court's judgment denying
St. Alphonsus those medical expenses incurred after Edmonds was
released on her own recognizance. Because of our disposition, we need
not address the question of whether a contract for payment existed.

Killeen, 124 Idaho at 199. Thus, the primary outcomes in the Killeen decision were
twofold: 1) the county was responsible for full reimbursement of the incurred
medical expenses, but 2) only as long as the patient was actually in custody.
However, after Killeen, the key statutes at issue in both that matter and this
matter - §31-3302, §20-612, & §20-605 - were variously amended, to ameliorate
both of these outcomes. Reference to medical costs was woven into Idaho Code §313302 and §20-612 (itself referring to §20-605); §20-605 was amended to require
payment for medical costs where an inmate was released to receive medical care;
and §31-3302 and §20-605 were revised to save counties money by limiting
payments to the reimbursement rate found in Idaho's medical indigency laws.
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Specifically, the following amended language was added:
•

Idaho Code §20-605:

In the absence of such agreement or order fixing the cost as provided in
section 20-606, Idaho Code, the charge for each person confined or
detained shall be the sum of thirty-five dollars ($35.00) per day, plus
the actual cost of any medical or dental services paid at the unadjusted
medicaid rate of reimbursement as provided in section 31-3502(4),
Idaho Code, unless a rate of reimbursement is otherwise established by
contract or agreement; . . . Release from an order pursuant to
section 20-604, Idaho Code, for the purpose of a person receiving
medical treatment shall not relieve the county of its obligation of
paying the medical care expenses imposed in this section.
•

Idaho Code §20-612:

It shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners to furnish all
persons committed to the county jail with necessary food, clothing and
bedding, and medical care as provided in section 20-605, Idaho Code,

•

Idaho Code §31-3302:

(3) The expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons
charged with or convicted of crime and committed therefor to the
county jail. Provided that any medical expenses shall be paid at the
unadjusted Medicaid rate of reimbursement as provided in section 313502(4), Idaho Code, unless a rate of reimbursement is otherwise
established by contract or agreement.
(R., 146-147.) 3 In light of these amendments, the two-fold primary outcomes from

Killeen are no longer possible. Now, instead, 1) a county obtains the benefit of the
lower reimbursement rate utilized in the medical indigency system, but 2) is still
responsible for medical care when a patient-inmate is released for purposes of
These are the 1994 amendments. Additional amendments were made to Idaho Code §313302 and §20-605 in 2009 and 2011 to further harmonize the language regarding the actual
rate of payment with that of the medical indigency program.

3
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receiving medical care.

B.

The District Court erred in failing to correctly apply Idaho Code §20612.
The thrust of the District Court's decision was, simply, that §20-605 is

inapplicable with respect to the Patient's care, because the Patient was no longer in
custody at the time the medical care was provided, and because the patient was not
housed in a different county:
Section 20-605 only applies to inmates housed in a different county.
The question was decided in Bannock County. v. City of Pocatello, 110
Idaho 292, 715 P.2d 962 (1986). In that case, the Court was asked to
decide whether the City of Pocatello was liable to Bannock County for
incarceration costs at the Bannock County Jail. ... The Court
explained:
"LC. §20-604, as amended, enables a district judge or
magistrate to order prisoners confined in any county jail
in that judicial district, or in any other county if an
agreement to that effect exists between the counties. I. C.
§20-605, as amended, defines which county is responsible
for the cost of jailing the prisoners in another county."

Id. at 294 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court concluded: "A more
reasonable alternative to the county's interpretation is that I.C. §§20604, -605 and -606 are specific statutes which pertain only to the
housing of prisoners in another county, while LC. §20-612 applies to
prisoners housed within the county." Id. at 295.
Here, it is undisputed that the Patient was both ordered confined and
actually held in custody by Ada County. It is also undisputed that Ada
County was responsible for the costs of medical care while the Patient
was in custody. This is mandated under section 31-3302, as the Patient
was a charge of the County. This is also mandated by section 20612, which applies to prisoners housed within their own
county. Section 20-605 simply does not apply.
(R., 264)(emphasis added).

However, the District Court's analysis abruptly and

inexplicably terminates here, without further analysis of §20-612.
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Saint Alphonsus agrees that Idaho Code §20-605 governs out-of-county
inmates, and that §20-612 governs same-county inmates. However, in this instance
- and with any same-county inmates - §20-605 expressly governs reimbursement
for medical costs because §20-612 specifically references LC. §20-605 with respect to
payment of medical costs:
20-612. Reception and board of prisoners. The sheriff must receive all
persons committed to jail by competent authority except mentally ill
persons not charged with a crime and juveniles. It shall be the duty of
the board of county commissioners to furnish all persons committed to
the county jail with necessary food, clothing and bedding, and
medical care as provided in section 20-605, Idaho Code, and the
board of county commissioners is authorized to pay therefor out of the
county treasury under such rules and regulations as they may
prescribe.
(emphasis added); see BHC Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada Cty., 150 Idaho 93, 96,
244 P.3d 237, 240 (2010)("This Court has held that when one statute references
another, only the portion that 'relates to the particular subject of the adopting
act, and ... is applicable and appropriate thereto' is incorporated.")(emphases in
original); accord, In re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677, 681, 183 P.3d 765, 769
(2008)("Where one statute adopts the particular provisions of another by a specific
and descriptive reference to the statute or provisions adopted, the effect is the

same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been incorporated
bodily into the adopting statute.")(emphasis added)(quoting Nampa & Meridian
Irrig. Distr.,v. Barker, 38 Idaho 529, 223 P. 529 (1924)).
Thus, Idaho Code §31-3302 provides the general recognition that counties are
responsible for the costs of medical care provided to inmates in their custody, and
Idaho Code §§20-605 and 20-612 specifically outline how such costs are going to be
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covered and reimbursed for out-of-county inmates and in-county inmates,
respectively. In turn, §20-612's reference and incorporation of §20-605 pulls over
three significant provisions regarding medical costs: 1) utilization of the medical
indigency reimbursement rate4; 2) securing reimbursement from inmates based
upon potential benefits available to those inmates; and 3) most salient here, that a
release from custody for medical care does not terminate a county's obligation to pay
for such care. Thus, bluntly, by the plain language of §20-605 (as incorporated via
§20-612), Ada County was obligated to pay for Patient's care after his release to
receive additional medical care.
Accordingly, in light of the District Court's error in not finding that Idaho
Code §20-605 was incorporated into §20-612 and thereby applicable to the medical
care provided to the Patient post-release, the District Court's summary judgment
decision should be reversed.

C.

Idaho's medical indigency program does not supplant the County's
obligation to pay for medical care for inmates.
In granting summary judgment to Ada County and denying Saint Alphonsus'

4 Which Ada County availed itself of in paying for Patient's in-custody care. Ada County
contended that such reduced-rate payments were made based only upon §31-3302 (R., 253254) rather than §20-605. Of course, §31-3302 is a general statute, broadly outlining costs
for which counties are responsible; for example, §31-3302 advises that counties are
responsible for "[t]he necessary expenses [for] the indigent sick ... whose support is
chargeable to the county." §31-3302(7). Of course, the more specific statutes addressing
the medical indigency process are exhaustively set out elsewhere, in Chapter 35 of Title 31.
The County's position - that §31-3302 as a general statute prevails over more specific
statutes - not only contradicts rote rules of statutory construction, but also cherry-picks
what statutes Ada County prefers to have referenced and incorporated. See, e.g., First Fed.
Sav. Bank of Twin Falls v. Riedesel Eng'g. Inc., 154 Idaho 626, 632, 301 P.3d 632, 638
(2012)("Where two statutes appear to apply to the same subject matter, the specific statute
will control over the more general statute.") Ada County cannot, on the one hand, avail
itself to the reference and incorporation of Title 31, Chapter 31 in §31-3302, but then refuse
to acknowledge the reference and incorporation of §20-605 into §20-612.
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cross-motion, the District Court also held that medical care for patient-inmates
post-release would be governed under the medical indigency program:
The sheriff and the county remain responsible for the payment to
prisoner medical care, indigent or not, but only at the Medicaid rate. If
an indigent prisoner is ordered to be confined in his or her own county,
then that county will still be liable for an indigent prisoner's medical
costs after release, but through the indigency statutes, Idaho Code
§31-3501 et seq.
(R., 266.) This is erroneous.

As discussed above, the amendments to the statutes at issue addressed the
two primary outcomes of the Killeen case, regarding the rate of payment, and
whether to reimburse for inmates released from custody. However, in Killeen, Ada
County had also argued, as here, that the medical indigency program was the
correct reimbursement process, an argument this Court rejected:
Ada County counters with its contention that the statutory scheme for
obtaining reimbursement for medical services to indigents applies to
all indigents, including those in the sheriffs custody, and that, in the
instant situation of an indigent pre-trial detainee, that scheme is the
mechanism by which the legislature intended care providers to seek
payment. See Idaho Code tit. 31, ch. 35 (1983).
We agree with St. Alphonsus that the Idaho Code contemplates that
when a person is in the sheriffs custody, whether indigent or not, the
sheriff and custodial county are responsible for payment of medical
expenses incurred.

We are sympathetic to Ada County's policy arguments against being
responsible for medical expenses-the anomaly being that when an
indigent is in jail, the hospital recovers more money than it would
under the indigency scheme and the reality that the sheriffs office is
not ordinarily so constituted to seek indemnity from other sources.
Nonetheless, the statutes collectively indicate that it is ultimately the
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sheriffs responsibility to pay for prisoners' medical expenses. Reallocation of that responsibility is within the province of the
legislature.

Killeen, 124 Idaho at 198-99. In fact, Killeen came to this Court on review from a
Court of Appeals decision erroneously concluding (as the District Court similarly
did here) that Idaho's medical indigency laws governed in-custody inmates' medical
care, a conclusion rejected by this Court in Killeen. 124 Idaho at 200 ("Nonetheless,
the statutes collectively indicate that it is ultimately the sheriffs responsibility to
pay for prisoners' medical expenses."); compare with St. Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, Ltd. v. Killeen, 124 Idaho 221, 858 P.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1992).
Moreover, Killeen clearly notes that medical expenses are the obligation of
the incarcerating county and not other Idaho counties, a holding that would
otherwise be incompatible under Chapter 35 were Idaho's medical indigency
program to apply. This is because under Chapter 35, an obligated county is only
responsible for the first $11,000 in medical bills, and the Catastrophic Health Care
fund, which derives its funds from all counties in Idaho, would be responsible for all
costs exceeding $11,000. See LC. §31-3502(5), -3503, -3503A, -3517.
Further, in addition to clashing with the holding in Killeen, imposition of the
medical indigency process on providers such as Saint Alphonsus would impose
additional burdens that are nowhere found in Title 20 and plainly not contemplated
by the Legislature. As is made clear above, all that is envisioned under Title 20 is
that if medical services are provided, then the jailing county will pay for such
expenses even after a patient is released from custody. By instead insisting that
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medical indigency is the correct course for inmate-patient post-release care, the
District Court would instead incorrectly be forcing providers to undertake the
burden of not only undertaking, but also proving, a medical indigency case
(generously assuming cooperation by the inmate-patient in submitting needed
information and documentation demanded by the County)5 - no small burden given
the requirements of the medical indigency statutes (see generally Idaho Code §§313501 et seq.), and, again, something plainly not contemplated in §31-3302, §20-605,
and/or §20-612.6
Thus, the District Court's conclusion that Idaho's medical indigency system
supplanted the counties' payment obligations for post-release inmate-patients under
Title 20 directly contradicts the plain language of the statutes at issue, and is in
error, especially in light of this Court's rejection of a similar argument in Killeen.

VII.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the District Court's October 25, 2016
Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment,
granting summary judgment to Ada County, and, in turn, denying Saint Alphonsus'

A prima facie case for proving medical indigency has long been settled, and consists of (1)
residency in the obligated county; (2) indigency from a standpoint of lack of resources; and
(3) medical necessity of the treatment. Mercy Med. Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226,
230, 192 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2008).
5

Further, under Idaho's medical indigency statutes, there is no guarantee (contrary to as
suggested by the District Court) that the incarcerating county would, in fact, be the
'obligated county,' given that medical indigency determines the 'obligated county' based
upon an analysis of duration of residency in a particular county. See Idaho Code §31-3506.
Thus, for example, a Wallace resident, arrested and jailed in Ada County and then
receiving medical care from Saint Alphonsus, would not result in payment from Ada
County; instead, Saint Alphonsus would need to initiate medical indigency proceedings
with Shoshone County.
6
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motion for summary judgment, should be reversed and remanded to the District
Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of August, 2017.
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
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